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The Virginia Beach Quest for Water: 
Drowning in a Sea of Litigation* 
"There's always an easy solution to every human problem-neat, plausi-
ble, and wrong." 1 
-H.L. Mencken 
I. INTRODUCI'ION 
The negotiated settlement in a then 12-year interstate water dispute 
between North Carolina and Virginia Beach fizzled at midnight June 30, 
1995 when unresolved issues extended past the deadline. This long-run-
ning dispute bears similarities to other interstate and intrastate water 
disputes. However, it does not yet rival the continuing Arizona-California 
dispute over the division of Colorado River water, nor does it reveal the 
extensive litigation to win approval for building the Central Arizona 
Project. 2 Nevertheless, this dispute on the opposite end of the country 
began when Virginia Beach recognized that its water resources would not 
meet the demands caused by the growth in population and industry. With 
minimal water supplies of its own, Virginia Beach initiated a 20-year 
agreement in 1973 with neighboring Norfolk to purchase excess Norfolk 
water. Shortly after the 1981 drought, Norfolk notified Virginia Beach that 
increasing demand for water within Norfolk created a shortage for Vir-
ginia Beach's increasing water needs. (In a dramatic about face in June 
1996, Norfolk released a comprehensive water study showing that Norfolk 
has the potential to produce an additional 18 million gallons per day (mgd) 
that could be sold to Virginia Beach.3 The impact of this study on Virginia 
Beach's plan to complete the pipeline will be discussed later.) 
At this point, Virginia Beach formulated a bold plan for resolving its 
projected water deficit: Virginia Beach would arrange to divert 60 million 
gallons per day (mgd) from the Roanoke River Basin via a 76-mile pipe-
line connecting Lake Gaston and Virginia Beach. The failure to obtain 
approval of the mediated agreement by the stipulated deadline reopened 
* Copyright © 1997 Richard T. Probst. 
I. James R. Adams, Freedom of !he Skies for Private Airplanes, LoS-ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 
18, 1986, at 2. 
2. JOSEPH L SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES CASES AND MATERIALS 
703-709 (2d ed. 1991) 
3. Karen Weintraub, Water Study Mav Affect Pipeline Battle, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, June 16, 
1996, at AI. 
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the doors to expensive, complicated, and time consuming litigation be-
tween Virginia Beach and numerous opposition groups to block the entire 
project. 
II. SHOWING THE NEED 
Once the need for water became apparent, Virginia Beach re-
searched the feasibility of several different possibilities such as the reuse 
of wastewater and the digging of wells. 4 The first alternative failed, how-
ever, the cost-effective reuse of wastewater requires a large amount of 
industrial and irrigation water, while service-oriented Virginia Beach is 
generally limited to potable water. Indeed, the costs for wastewater reuse 
would have rivaled those for desalinization without providing Virginia 
Beach with any additional supplies of water. When Virginia Beach tried 
digging test wells, it discovered that large wells would quickly become 
contaminated by saltwater intrusion, and many shallow wells for single 
houses would go dry. The remaining alternatives included the desaliniza-
tion of ocean water and/or purchasing water from another municipality. 
Believing that the desalinization of large quantities of water was too 
expensive, Virginia Beach opted for the latter alternative. 
In the meantime, due to the length of the litigation, Virginia Beach has 
been forced to place restrictions on the use of city water. Prohibited water 
uses include commercial car washing facilities, the filling of personal 
swimming pools with publically supplied water, serving water at restau-
rants when not requested by customers, and using a hose rather than a 
bucket to wash personal vehicles. Besides these restriction~. the city 
government has also provided economic incentives to encourage builders 
and home owners to use water saving toilets, taps, and shower faucets. 5 
Currently the city uses 32 mgd on average, which is four mgd less than it 
would use on a restriction-free basis. Several years ago, the city of Ports-
mouth offered to sell five mgd to Virginia Beach on three conditions: 1) 
that the water quantity was not guaranteed, 2) that the payment would 
equal $2 per 1,000 gallons of untreated and unguaranteed water, and 3) 
that Virginia Beach would reverse itself and support Portsmouth on an 
unrelated issue.6 Those conditions were unacceptable to Virginia Beach 
which would have to build a pipeline to Norfolk, and pay Norfolk to treat 
the additional water that might cease to be available after a couple of 
years. For these reasons Virginia Beach sought a guaranteed supply of 
water from a nearby basin that had a large water surplus. 
4. Telephone Interview with Thomas Leahy, Lake Gaston Project Manager for the City of 
Virginia Beach, Va. (Aug. 28, 1995). 
5. ld. 
6. ld. 
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III. VIRGINIA BEACH'S PROPOSED SOLUTION 
At the outset, Virginia Beach authorities noted that there was 
enough surplus water in the Roanoke River Basin to meet the city's needs. 
The city administrators estimated that its proposed withdrawal of 60 mgd 
amounted to an average of less than two percent of the average total river 
flow. 7 If Virginia Beach could acquire the requisite water rights, it would 
build a pipeline to bring water to the city from Lake Gaston-a large 
manmade lake that holds the Roanoke River water on the Virginia-North 
Carolina border. The proposal for a two percent diversion of Roanoke 
River water has invoked a spirited response from at least three pipeline 
opponents. Mr. Barr, President of the Roanoke River Basin Association 
(RRBA), explained that the two percent figure is based on an average flow 
figure of five billion gallons a day (bgd), when in reality the river's daily 
flow can drop as low as two bgd. At two bgd the percentage of Virginia 
Beach's diverted water would rise to eight percent, thereby increasing the 
chances of detrimental environmental impact. 8 Mr. Gerald Lovelace, 
Assistant County Administrator, Halifax County, asserts that a two percent 
diversion would mean that much growth and money would go else-
where-in this case to Virginia Beach.9 Mr. G. Morris Wells, Jr., Town 
Manager of South Hill, Virginia, fears that a withdrawal by Virginia 
Beach would set a precedent for other cities also take water. 10 Neverthe-
less, Mr. T. Keister Greer stated in a recent interview that if Virginia 
Beach could guarantee that this would be a one-time allocation of Roanoke 
River Basin water, then he, as legal counsel for Virginia's Southside 
Legislators, would be satisfied with the result of the litigation. 11 North 
Carolina's opposition to the pipeline reflects determination to preserve 
what it considers a priceless resource to be preserved for the future. 
The fact that the supplemental water would come from an interbasin 
water transfer using a 76-mile pipeline connecting Lake Gaston and 
Virginia Beach further complicates the proposed water acquisition. Lake 
Gaston is on the North Carolina-Virginia border. Two-thirds of Lake 
Gaston lies in North Carolina, though about 70 percent of the lake water 
originates in Virginia. Because the lake is mostly in North Carolina, that 
state also has an interest in the proposed water transfer. Under general 
7. !d. 
8. Interview with William E. Barr, President of the Roanoke River Basin Association, in 
Danville, Va. (Aug. 18, 1995). 
9. Interview with Gerald Lovelace, Assistant Administrator of Halifax County, Virginia. 
in Halifax, Va. (Aug. 18, 1995). 
10. Interview with G. Morris Wells, Jr., Town Manager of South Hill, Va. (Aug. 25, 1995). 
11. Interview with T. Keister Greer, Water Rights Attorney Representing Southside 
Legislators, in Rocky Mount, Va. (July 26, 1996). 
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riparian water law, interbasin transfers are not permitted. The State of 
Virginia has not intervened in the litigation because the proposed project 
involves an intrastate interbasin water transfer, and therefore governmental 
leaders did not want to take sides in what has become a political hot 
potato. Because the Army Corps of Engineers directs dam projects along 
the Roanoke River, and because the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion (FERC) regulates Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) 
which manages Lake Gaston for hydroelectric power along the Roanoke 
River Basin, approval from both agencies was necessary in order to begin 
construction on the project. 
Virginia Beach began the approval process by approaching VEPCO, 
which used Lake Gaston for generating hydroelectric power. VEPCO 
created Lake Gaston after it received a 50-year permit from FERC to dam 
the Roanoke River to generate power. Completed in 1963, Lake Gaston is 
located in rural Virginia and North Carolina counties, 12 and is surrounded 
by countless homes of vacationers, retirees, and others who enjoy the 
water-skiing, fishing, swimming, and boating the lake offers. VEPCO 
agreed to provide Virginia Beach with the land easements to make water 
withdrawals on the condition that Virginia Beach reimburse VEPCO for 
the power losses resulting from the decreased river flow turning the hydro-
electric generators. Upon reaching agreement with the City of Virginia 
Beach, VEPCO sought PERC's approval to modify its license for Virginia 
Beach's intended withdrawals in order for the project to begin. 
On July 15, 1983, Virginia Beach applied for final approval with the 
Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) to begin construction on the 
project. 13 Virginia Beach also sought to contract with the Corps to release 
water in the Kerr Reservoir to supplement the lowered river flow caused 
by the proposed withdrawal. In December 1983, the Corps issued an 
environmental assessment (EA) containing a finding of no significant 
impact (FONSI). A FONSI meant that no Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS) would have to be completed for the project's approval. The Corps 
decided that river flow (approximately five bgd) as compared to the pro-
posed withdrawal (60 mgd) would not significantly impact the Roanoke 
River Basin. 14 The yearly water levels at Kerr Reservoir above Lake 
Gaston already fluctuated 22 feet because of VEPCO's withdrawals. 
12. Karen Weintraub, Gaston Deal at Eland; N.C., Beach to Sign Pact Friday; Both Sides 
to End Legal Fight; Legislatures Must Sign by July; Beach to OK Norfolk Water Plant, 
VIRGL"'IAN-PILOT, Apr. 27, 1995, at Al. 
13. Nooh Carolina v. Hudson, 665 F. Supp. 428, 432 (E.D.N.C. 1987), further appeal 731 
F. Supp. 1261 (E.D.N.C. 1990), af!'d 940 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1991). 
14. ld. at 433. 
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According to the Corps, the Lake Gaston withdrawals would cause an 
almost imperceptible impact. 
The Corps also looked at the environmental impact of the withdrawals 
and found that the most significant impact on wildlife would be to the 
striped bass or rockfishY The Roanoke River Basin's concern for the 
striped bass was that the lowered stream flow at the darns would not allow 
the bass to spawn properly. Bass lay their eggs on the water's surface and 
as a result of the water's rapid flow, the eggs remain on the surface to 
hatch. 16 The Corps was aware of problems with low bass populations in 
recent years. However, the Corps concluded that the main reason for the 
low bass populations was over-fishing rather than a low river flow. 17 The 
Corps determined that new fishing regulations would significantly stabi-
lize the bass population. 18 
Although the Corps' main interest was investigating the repercussions 
of water withdrawals from the lake, the Corps also looked at the environ-
mental impact of the 76-mile pipeline and decided that the impact would 
be insignificant--thus an EIS would not be required. 19 
IV. THE LIDGATION PROCESS BEGINS 
On January 9, 1984, the City of Virginia Beach filed a federal action 
in the "Eastern District of Virginia against the RRBA and the Governor of 
North Carolina seeking a declaratory judgment that the permit and contract 
were valid."20 However, the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled 
that the Virginia statute did not give Virginia Beach jurisdiction over the 
Governor of North Carolina. On January 12, 1984, Virginia Beach signed 
the contract for approving the project with the Corps. That same day the 
State of North Carolina, "alleg(ing) that issuance of the pipeline construc-
tion permit was arbitrary and capricious and in violation of NEP A, the 
Clean Water Act, the Rivers and Harbors Act, the Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act, the Water Supply Act, and the federal regulations implementing 
15. Norfolk District, Corps of Engineers, United States Dept. of the Army, Supplement 
Environmental A~sessment of a permit application for construction of a water supply pipeline and 
appm1enant structures in Lake Gaston and crossing several rivers, at 2 (Dec. 21, 1988). 
16. Hudson, 731 F. Supp. at 1264. 
17. Id. 
18. Norfolk District, supra note 15, at 2. 
19. Norfolk District, Corps of Engineers, United States Dept. of the Army, Supplement 
Statement of Findings, Permit No. 83-0747-06, at 10 (Dec. 21, 1988). According to federal 
regulations, an EIS need only be completed when there is a finding of significant impact to the 
environment. It is also important to note here that the National Marine Fisheries Services (NMFS), 
a division within the U.S. Department of Commerce, provided its support for the Lake Gaston 
project and provided significant scientific data supporting the proposed project to the Corps. 
20. See Hudson, 665 F. Supp. at 433. 
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those acts," filed suit against the Army Corps of Engineers?1 However, the 
permit to go ahead with the project was signed by the Assistant Secretary 
of the Army for Civil Works on January 30, 1984. 
At the same time, fearing that the Virginia Beach proposal to take 
water from their basin would be approved, the Roanoke River Basin 
Association (RRBA), which represents a group of communities surround-
ing Lake Gaston, sought to intervene in the North Carolina lawsuit. They 
were admitted on June 20, 1984. The RRBA complaint mirrored the 
original complaint and added a challenge to the water storage reallocation 
contract. 22 Meanwhile, Virginia Beach was given the opportunity to 
remove its suit against the Governor of North Carolina to the Eastern 
District of North Carolina. The City of Virginia Beach's motion to com-
bine the two cases was denied because Virginia Beach had already been 
received as an intervener in the State of North Carolina case. In December 
1985, discovery ended and all facts concerning the cases were agreed to on 
March 28, 1986.23 The district court issued two opinions which said that 
the Corps was not required to issue an EIS, but remanded the case for 
further findings on two issues. First, to be sure that the Corps decision to 
approve the permit was not "arbitrary and capricious"24 the court required 
the Corps to make an independent assessment of the effect of the proposed 
withdrawal on the spawning of the striped bass and to determine whether 
an EIS would be necessary. Second, the Corps was to make a determina-
tion of the extent of Virginia Beach's water needs. The case returned to 
district court after the Corps had completed a Supplemental EA, which 
was a revised finding of no significant impact (RFONSI), and determined 
how much water Virginia Beach would need. 25 The court was satisfied at 
the hearing on the matters for remand with both findings-that there 
would be no significant impact and that Virginia Beach would indeed need 
the water. The Corps permit was reissued with a modification ensuring 
that a sufficient flow would be maintained in the Roanoke River during the 
bass spawning season. North Carolina appealed the final decision to 
reissue the permit. 
Meanwhile, Virginia Beach did not want to be delayed by litigation 
and announced plans to begin construction of the parts of the pipeline not 
under FERC's jurisdiction on December 10, 1990. On November 30, 1990, 
North Carolina filed an injunction to stop the construction until FERC had 
21. See ld. 
22. See Id. 
23. See ld. at 434. 
24. See !d. at 437. 
25. Hudson, 731 F. Supp. at 1263. 
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made a final decision.Z6 The injunction was granted ten days later. Virginia 
Beach then sought to amend the injunction to permit it to build portions of 
the proposed pipeline that involved six river crossings and parts of the 
pump station. 
While Virginia Beach awaited a hearing on the proposed modification 
to the injunction granted to North Carolina, the appeal of the court's 
decision to uphold the Corps permit was heard on February 7, 1991.27 The 
Fourth Circuit Court stated that the main issue in this appeal is whether the 
Corp's decision is "arbitrary and capricious." The RRBA argued that 
withdrawals of such magnitude would affect the environment and that the 
Corps had failed to fully consider the effects of a year-round withdrawal of 
water on the future water needs of Virginia Beach, on water quality, on the 
striped bass population, and on all users during times of drought. Although 
the court recognized that the City of Virginia Beach was growing faster 
than earlier projections from 1984,28 it refused to overturn the 1984 and 
1987 Hudson decisions for being either "arbitrary or capricious" on the 
grounds that the Corps had not considered the future water needs of 
downstream water users.Z9 
When its appeals failed, North Carolina continued to object to Vir-
ginia Beach's proposal to modify the injunction that blocked construction 
of any segment of the proposed pipeline until FERC had given its final 
approval. North Carolina argued that to approve construction on a part of 
the pipeline outside of FERC' s jurisdiction would interfere with FERC' s 
decisions elsewhere. The interference, North Carolina argued, would result 
from Virginia Beach's significant expenditures of money and the fact that 
Virginia Beach had already built several portions of the pipeline. Virginia 
Beach said that it was willing to take the risk even though the expenditure 
may be lost if FERC denied the city's request to build the pipeline. The 
appellate court reversed the decision of the district court saying that: 
[C]onstruction which lies beyond the boundaries of FERC' s juris-
diction can be enjoined only when it has a direct and substantial 
probability of influencing FERC' s decision. Against that standard, 
the reach of the injunction entered here, in prohibiting the two 
relatively minor phases of construction sought in Virginia Beach's 
motion to alter or amend, cannot as a matter of law be justified.30 
26. North Carolina v. City of Virginia Beach, 951 F. 2d 596, 600 (4th Cir. 1991). 
27. RRBA v. Hudson, 940 F. 2d 58 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. den., 112 S. Ct. 1164 (1992). 
28. Hudson, 731 F. Supp. at 1272. 
29. Hudson, 940 F.2d at 65. 
30. City of Virginia Beach, 951 F.2d at 603. 
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In dissent, however, Judge Murnaghan made a statement that has in a 
sense become a self-fulfilling prophecy. He said that the appeals court had 
reviewed the case de novo instead of using the court's own "clearly errone-
ous" standard. 31 He further stated that by permitting the modification and 
allowing an additional $8.4 million to be spent in excess of the $18.1 
million already spent would result in more than $26.5 million spent out of 
a $218 million project. 32 He also wondered whether any further work on 
the project would unduly influence the decision-making agencies as they 
seek independently to review project applications. Now, five years later, 
Virginia Beach has taken the risk to begin building the pipeline before the 
litigation has ended, and has spent more than $36 million on the pipeline 
project, not including the currently accruing expense of approximately $1 
million per week in building the pipeline. 33 
In 1991, North Carolina moved to block the project by invoking the 
Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) which requires the approval of an 
application for a project by the state in which the project is planned. 34 
North Carolina argued that it had the right to review the project to see if it 
coincided with its own comprehensive plan to manage its coastal environ-
ments. The state was given reviewing power and blocked the Virginia 
Beach project characterizing it as contrary to North Carolina's coastal 
environmental management plans. Virginia Beach objected and sued. 
However, on December 3, 1992, upon the recommendation of the Justice 
Department, Secretary of Commerce Barbara Franklin reversed the deci-
sion to grant North Carolina the right to review the Virginia Beach project, 
saying that it would be wrong to permit North Carolina to review the 
project. 35 In early 1993, Ron Brown, the new Secretary of Commerce, 
upheld that decision. However, the Department of Justice withdrew its 
previous opinion which gave North Carolina the power under CZMA to 
review the planned pipeline. Following the Justice Department's reversal 
of opinions, on December 14, 1993, Secretary Brown reversed his decision 
and permitted the review by North Carolina. 36 On December 23, 1993, 
Virginia Beach sued the Department of Commerce and on January 12, 
1994, North Carolina intervened in the lawsuit_37 
In order to obtain FERC approval for the entire project the National 
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) again had to sign off on the project. 
31. !d. at 606. 
32. !d. at 613. 
33. Toni Whitt, The Cost of Supplying Beach with Water from Gaston: $242 million, 
VIRGINIAN-PII.Df, Apr. 27, 1995, at All. 
34. City of Virginia Beach v. Brown, 858 F. Supp. 585, 587 (E.D. Va. 1994). 
35. !d. at 587. 
36. Id. 
37. Jd. 
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Even though NMFS had already given its approval for the project once, 
the service refused to grant its further approval, explaining that an EIS 
must be completed for categorical NMFS approval. Meanwhile, Virginia 
Beach tried to show that although the State of North Carolina and the 
NMFS had already participated in the Corps' approval of the proposed 
pipeline in 1983. Nevertheless, the NMFS had withdrawn its consent and 
support for the prqject on December 7, 1987 in a notice to FERC. 38 Dr. 
William W. Fox, Jr., then head of NMFS explained that its reversal came 
after it had transferred approval authority for the pipeline to a different 
NMFS division more familiar with the project's area. 39 Virginia Beach 
believed NMFS's reversal was arbitrarily reached because of influence 
gained through a close working relationship between that particular NMFS 
division and North Carolina's division of natural resources which had 
developed because an NMFS scientist was serving concurrently as the 
head of an environmental group opposed to the project. Virginia Beach 
filed suit April 9, 1991, invoking the Freedom of Information Act to obtain 
documents that would implicate the decision to reverse the NMFS' posi-
tion and thereby effectively block the proposed pipeline.40 North Carolina 
and NMFS argued that releasing most of the documents would violate the 
"work product" privilege, though the district court judge refused to extend 
the work product exception to most of the documents. North CaroHna and 
NMFS appealed. Although some documents were granted privileged 
status, the court ordered that documents requested under FOIA to be 
released to Virginia Beach.41 Despite the suspicious NMFS turnabout in 
recommending denial of the permit until a complete EIS was completed, 
PERC went forward with plans to complete an EIS. 
On December 27, 1994, the State of North Carolina and Virginia 
Beach announced that they would seek a federally mediated agreement 
before continuing their legal battle over the Lake Gaston Project. 42 Just 
four months later on April 28, 1995, the parties reached a mediated agree-
ment through the good offices of John G. Bickerman.43 
38. See City of Virginia Beach v. United States Dep't of Commer., 805 F. Supp. 1323, 
1325 (E.D. Va. 1992), 995 F.2d 1247 (4th Cir. 1993). 
39. Id. at 1326. 
40. /d. at 1324. 
41. /d. 
42. N.C., Beach OK Mediation for I Gaston Issue, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Dec. 28, 1994, at B2. 
43. Va. Beach to Draw Water from N.C., WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 29, 1995, at B5. See 
also Mason Peters et al., Gaston Breakthrough; Possible Truce in 15-Year VA.-N.C. Battle is at 
Hand; The Deal, Far from Final, Could End Tangle of litigation, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Apr. 7, 1995, 
at AI. 
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Among other stipulations, the mediated agreement44 contained the follow-
ing provisions: 
- Virginia Beach and surrounding communities could withdraw up to 60 
million gallons of water a day. (This withdrawal rate will not be reached 
until long after the year 2030 iflong-term estimates are correct.)45 
-North Carolina may connect to the pipeline and take 35 mgd-15 mgd 
for the Outer Banks and 20 mgd for unnamed northern North Carolina 
communities. 
- Project costs are to be paid by Virginia Beach. 
- Lake Gaston water cannot be sold outside of Southside, Virginia. 
-Virginia Beach will purchase some water in Kerr Reservoir to be used 
to supplement a minimum river flow in times of drought and during the 
bass spawning season. 
- Virginia Beach will continue to employ conservation measures. 
-Virginia agrees to expand two roads (Route 17 and 168) to accommo-
date traffic to and from the Outer Banks of North Carolina. 
-A Bi-State Water Commission will be created. (The RRBA, however, 
calls this commission biased because the Roanoke River Basin has no 
direct representation.) 
--Virginia Beach will pay $200,000 annually to maintain the Lake Gaston 
reservoir and suppress algae growth. 
- Virginia Beach will not interfere with Lake Gaston's current recre-
ational uses. 
- TI1e agreement is subject to FERC' s approval which is expected by the 
end of Summer 1995, and FERC may not substantially change the pro-
posed settlement, or the deal is annulled. 
- The parties agree to drop all attempts to litigate the Lake Gaston matter. 
(At this time the agreeing parties did not include the members and towns 
of the RRBA, and this complicates the ratification and implementation of 
the agreement.) 
- A 60-day time limit was set for ratification by both state legislatures, 
the governors, senators, congress, Virginia Beach, and Norfolk. 46 
- Virginia Beach, Chesapeake, and North Carolina agreed to attempt 
legislation of a North Carolina-Virginia interstate compact "which would 
provide that no new or increased out-of-basin transfers of water ... [may 
44. Tom Holden, No Longer A Pipe Dream, Ulke Gaston Project Now Seem1· A Certainty, 
But Beach Residents Will Have to Maintain One of The Nation's Best Conservation Habits, The 
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, May 3, 1995, at 12. 
45. Reply Brief of Petitioner at 22, State of North Carolina v. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, Nos. 95-1494 and 95-1599 (9th Cir. 1996). 
46. Again the 60-day deadline for ratification is viewed as a fatal flaw by the author 
because politicians are notoriously slow decision-makers, and each level of government must wait 
for lower-level ratification before taking real steps to resolve any final disagreements over details. 
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occur] from the Roanoke River Basin at any point above the Roanoke 
Rapids Dam without the consent of each state."47 
Additional modifications48 were announced on June 26, 1995: 
- Virginia Beach promises not to interfere with upstream uses of water 
from Lake Gaston. (It may be unrealistic to expect an entity to refrain from 
future actions to support its 12-year quest and stand idly by while the plan 
crumbled.) 
- Virginia Beach will assure Norfolk that it will purchase Norfolk's 
surplus water before withdrawing water from Lake Gaston as long as the 
Norfolk water is not more expensive than that of Lake Gaston. This as-
sures Norfolk of a continued demand for its excess water. 
-South-central Virginia will have a role in the Bi-State Water Commis-
sion49 
- Virginia Beach will pay Lake Gaston communities five cents per 1,000 
gallons for the water, but no less than $200,000 per year and an additional 
$300,000 per year to fight the hydrilla that grows in Lake Gaston. 50 
There was a strong reaction to the mediated agreement from the 
Roanoke River Basin, which had been excluded from the mediation pro-
cess. President Barr of the RRBA said that the agreement was outrageous 
because it took control of Roanoke River Basin waters from surrounding 
communities and gave it to eastern Virginia and North Carolina. 51 He 
claimed that it started with a 60 mgd proposed withdrawal and ended with 
another 35 mgd withdrawal for North Carolina-all of which exemplifies 
the future plan to slowly take more water from the Roanoke River Basin. 
Mr. Lovelace of Halifax County was bothered by the constitutionality of 
the city of Virginia Beach negotiating an interstate compact with another 
state-namely North Carolina. 52 He further stated that the agreement also 
47. Keister Greer is a leading water-rights attorney who consulted with the RRBA. Greer 
wanted a stipulation preventing further interbasin water transfers to allay the concerns of Roanoke 
River Ba~in citi7..ens who feared that this project would set a precedent for other water-poor regions 
of the two states to take water from Lake Gaston. In this case, water-poor cities would then only 
need to apply for permits to take water from another basin. Such a policy is contrary to riparian 
common law. See Todd Jackson, Pipeline Foes' Lawyer Opts to Change Plan, Not Fight It, 
RoANOKE TIMES & WoRlD NEWS, May 6, 1995, at Cl. See also Interview with T.K. Greer, supra, 
note 11. 
48. Mason Peters et a!., Gaston Breakthrough; Possible Truce in 15-Year VA.-N.C. Battle 
is at Hand; The Deal, Far from Final, Could End Tangle of Litigation, VJRGINIAN-PILaf, APR. 
7, 1995, at AI;. Christopher Kirkpatrick, Governor Bashing Popular Sport around Lake Gaston, 
HERALD-SUN, July 3, 1995, at AI; Karen Weintraub & Richard Little, Lake Gaston Deal Awaits; 
Allen's Call for Session, RoANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, June 27, 1995, at Cl. 
49. The author hesitates to speculate as to what this role will be--and whether this action 
is too little too late. 
50. Cynically speaking, this is, perhaps, a last-minute token gesture. 
51. Interview with William E. Barr, supra note 8. 
52. Interview with Gerald Lovelace, supra note 9. 
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provided for Virginia taxpayers to pay to widen roads to North Carolina's 
Outer Banks which means that some state money will go to benefit citizens 
of another state. Mr. Wells of South Hill's echoed Mr. Lovelace's argu-
ment on the constitutionality of the agreement and added that the mediated 
agreement was a sellout by Virginia Beach so it did not have to consult 
with the Roanoke River Basin communities. 53 One source close to the 
mediation stated that Virginia Beach was the party that blocked the partici-
pation of Norfolk or Southside Virginia in the mediated agreement. On the 
other hand, North Carolina favored the inclusion of all parties to find a 
more acceptable agreement. 
In May 1995, the communities of south-central Virginia began to band 
together, with each community or county donating $5,000 to $10,000 
dollars to file suit against the proposed pipeline. 54 Just previously, the City 
of Virginia Beach authorized the expansion of Norfolk water treatment 
facilities in expectation of Lake Gaston water. 55 Virginia Beach had to 
authorize the expansion of Norfolk facilities, or the water contract it had 
spent tcmr years negotiating with Norfolk would lapse. Meanwhile, Nor-
folk and Virginia Beach scrambled to negotiate a settlement over provi-
sions of the separate interstate compact. 
Under the original agreement, Norfolk's ability to sell its excess water 
was restricted, even though it was not guaranteed that its surplus water 
would continue to be purchased by Virginia Beach. Virginia Beach agreed 
to modify the agreement to purchase Norfolk water as long as it was as 
cheap as Lake Gaston water. Furthermore, Norfolk would only be obli-
gated to sell excess water until the year 2010 when it was assumed that 
growth would require Norfolk to use the water for its own population. 56 
The agreement was ratified on June 26, 1995. At that point, however, 
because the Virginia Legislature had ended its 1995 session, Governor 
George Allen would need to call a special legislative session to permit the 
ratification of the mediated agreement between Virginia Beach and North 
Carolina by June 30, 1995. Although Governor Allen had indicated that he 
would call a special session of the legislature, he did not, blaming his 
decision on Democratic Party politics 57 despite the fact the that the deci-
sion was ultimately Governor Allen's. Newspapers said that the Governor 
53. Interview with W. Morris Wells, Jr., supra note 10. 
54. Richard Foster, Bedford Votes to Block Pipeline; County Pays $5,000 to Join Lawsuit, 
ROANOKE TIMES & WoRIDNEWS, May 23, 1995, at C3: see also Interview with W. Morris Wells, 
Town Manager of South Hill, Va., in South Hill, Va. (Aug. 25, 1995). 
55. Karen Weintraub, Gaston Pipeline Runs Hot, Cold, VIRGINIAN-PILor, Dec. 31, 1995, 
at 7. 
56. Karen Weintraub & David M. Poole, Terr/Vi of Gaston Deal Disclosed; Still Up in the 
Air: Approval of Both States' Assemblies by Month's End, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, June 21, 1995, at Bl. 
57. Peter Baker, Va. Feuding Sends Pact on Water Down Drain; Allen Refuses to Convene 
Special Session, Sinking Deal with N.C .in Works Since '82, WASH. PosT, June 29, 1995, at C3. 
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did not call a special session because he was afraid that the Democratically 
controlled state legislature would not only ratify the mediated agreement, 
but attempt to legislate pork barrel projects to gain reelection and retain 
control of the legislature. When Democratic Party leaders refused to 
guarantee that they would only have the legislature consider the Lake 
Gaston project, Allen assumed the worst and refused to call the special 
session.58 However, according to Virginia Assemblyman Ted Bennett, 
Governor Allen did not call a special legislative session because of the 
bipartisan opposition to the pipeline and the precedent a negative vote 
would establish. 59 However, Mr. Bennett, who was on the special subcom-
mittee to investigate and make a recommendation concerning the Lake 
Gaston Project, said that the Governor had such an interest in the passage 
of the mediated agreement that his chief of staff (Mr. Frank Atkinson) was 
at almost all of the subcommittee hearings. 60 As one of the committee's 
minority in opposing the pipeline, Mr. Bennett felt like he was trying to 
"fight a train," because of the powerful interests which wanted the agree-
ment ratified. 61 In one of the subcommittee's public hearings in a south-
central Virginia community, the citizens claimed that the Roanoke River 
Basin had been left out of the mediation and had been given only token 
representation on the special subcommittee. 62 North Carolina believed the 
agreement to be fair at the time, and was a compromise, however, that met 
the basic requirements North Carolina was seeking.63 Governor Allen did 
not call the special legislative session because he did not want the pipe-
line's opponents to gain strength from a failure of the state legislature to 
ratify the mediated agreement. This fear was compounded in 1992 when 
the legislature passed the Gr~mndwater Management Act which said 
"[t]hat certain amounts of water shall be withdrawn from the Roanoke 
River at Lake Gaston for additional public water supply by the city of 
Virginia Beach. "64 Even the appearance of an opinion reversal in the 
legislature by the failure to ratify the mediated agreement would 
strengthen pipeline opponents. Because it was apparent that the pipeline 
agreement lacked support in the legislature, the June 30, 1995, deadline 
came and went without the necessary ratifications. 
58. /d. 
59. Interview with W.W. "Ted" Bennett, Jr., Virginia State Legislator in Halifax, Virginia 
(Aug. 25, 1995). 
60. /d. 
61. !d. 
62. /d. 
63. Interview with source close to North Carolina, name withheld, in N.C. (July 1996). 
64. Groundwater Management Act of 1992, VA. CODE ANN. 62.1-254 (1995). 
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V. SETTING NEW PRECEDENT 
Until recently, the eastern United States had no water shortages. 
Eastern states were usually more worried about too much rainfall which 
saturated the ground and caused massive flooding. Beginning in the 1940's 
the number of flood control projects began to mushroom as communi-
ties-including those in the Roanoke River Basin----<ieveloped plans to 
prevent the seemingly yearly deluge. Since then, a number of large eastern 
cities have begun to announce that their freshwater supplies are inadequate 
to meet water demand. Water shortages are relatively new to the east 
coast, as are the accompanying legal precedents necessary for jurisdictions 
with inadequate water supplies. Eastern states have developed a legal 
foundation based on the common law's riparian system for water distribu-
tion. Riparian law granted water rights to anyone with land abutting a 
river. If land did not have a stream or river, usually a well could provide 
drinking water while rain provided the necessary irrigation for crops, 
lawns, and gardens. Under the common law, interbasin transfers of water 
were both illegal and impractical because there was no way to transfer the 
water from one river basin to another. However, with the development of 
new technologies to transfer water, interbasin transfers began in the West 
to solve local water shortages. The Lake Gaston compact could set prece-
dent in permitting the large-scale interbasin transfer of water under a 
riparian legal system for water management. Mr. T. Keister Greer has 
pointed out the necessity of limiting interbasin water transfers so the 
mistakes of the past are not repeated. 65 Specifically, Mr. Greer cited the 
example of California's Owens Valley. Once a green valley, it is now a 
desert due to the extraction of most of its water by Los Angeles. 66 How-
ever, Mr. Grt:>.er believes that the settlement of the Lake Gaston water 
dispute will have important precedential effects in the eastern states and in 
other water-hungry jurisdictions in riparian localities that seek water from 
other basins. 67 
As a state legislator, Mr. Bennett advocates the development of a 
reasonable water policy in Virginia. Such a water policy would not permit 
interbasin withdrawals if there is excess water in the basin. 68 RRBA 
President Barr advocates a policy that also includes a stipulation that those 
initiating interbasin transfers would not have the right to limit or regulate 
upstream water uses from the point of withdrawal. 69 Mr. Bennett would 
65. Interview with T.K. Greer, supra note 11. 
66. Richard Steele & John Barnes, CAllFORNJA: War over Water, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 4. 
1976, at 47. 
67. Interview with T.K. Greer, supra note 11. 
68. Interview with W.W. "Ted" Bennett, supra note 59. 
69. Interview with William E. Barr, supra note 8. 
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also add the requirement of the consent from the host jurisdiction before 
an interbasin transfer would be permitted. 70 He pointed out that although 
other interbasin transfers do take place in Virginia, this would be the first 
large-scale transfer and the first transfer in which the host jurisdiction 
objected to the transfer. Mr. Wells of South Hill added that a good water 
policy would include the development of an agreement concerning what 
portion of the Roanoke River would be allocated to each state.71 This 
suggestion is similar to the current Colorado River Compact which actu-
ally specifies the amount of water each state may withdraw from the 
Colorado River. The Lake Gaston dispute could be a blessing in disguise 
if the resulting agreement concerning the water rights were resolved and a 
gcx)d foundational water policy developed which is sensitive to the needs 
of both water-poor and water-rich jurisdictions. 
VI. THE WEST HAS NECESSARY PRECEDENT 
In the West, water shortages are a way of life. It has been common for 
land to be farmed using the existing water until the often umeplenished or 
inconsistent water sources dried up and the land was abandoned. In the 
absence of rain, irrigation projects were built to support agriculture. From 
the day of their arrival in Utah, Mormon Pioneers devised community 
irrigation districts that allocated the water among the citizens. Utah water 
legislation passed in 1903 adopted the appropriation doctrine that "subor-
dinated citizens rights to the rights of the state and required permits to use 
water for irrigation--as the basis for acquisition of water rights.'m Colo-
rado water law was established by miners who would stake claims to river 
water, the same way they claimed mines. This doctrine of prior appropria-
tion has been called the "First in time, first in right" rule. 73 When western 
states became aware in the early 1900's that the Colorado River was 
insufficient to meet the needs of the growing populations of the several 
states in that river basin, an interstate compact became necessary. 
In 1922, the United States Supreme Court in Wyoming v. Colorado, 
stated that the doctrine of prior appropriation would govern western water 
rights in interstate disputes.74 The Colorado River was divided into an 
upper basin (Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming) and lower 
basin (Arizona, California, and Nevada) in the 1922 interstate compact. 
70. Interview with W.W. ''Ted" Bennett, supra note 59. 
71. Interview with G. Morris Wells, Jr., supra note 10. 
72. Richard T. Probst, The Origins of Groundwater Laws in Arizona, Colorado, and Utah, 
B.Y.U. PRE-lAW REV. (Winter 1993). 
73. Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc., 529 P.2d 1321, 
1324 (Colo. 1974). 
74. SAX, supra note 2, at 703. 
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Most of the states ratified the compact. Arizona refused to ratify the 
compact until 1944 when it realized that until it ratified the Colorado River 
Compact, Congress would not approve funding for the Central Arizona 
Project (CAP). A continuing dispute with California over project details 
delayed the project for years. The project was not approved by Congress 
until 1968, and the first CAP water was delivered in 1985. The Colorado 
River Compact was negotiated (but not ratified) in a short period of time. 
However, details delayed construction of projects in Arizona for decade..'>. 
The compact involved multiple states and interests, but there were really 
no national environmental laws, no clean water acts, no large or well-
funded pro-environment groups, no Endangered Species Act, no real 
consideration given to Indian water rights, and no required environmental 
impact statements. Moreover, United State..<; society at that time was Jess 
litigious, and Nevada was not seeking a large quantity of water, because it 
did not foresee the explosive growth in Las Vegas. It is improbable that an 
interstate compact for the Colorado River could ever be negotiated on a 
timely basis in the 1990's among so many states and interests even though 
the foundational legal doctrine of prior appropriation easily lends itself to 
interbasin water transfers. Despite a good legal foundation for interbasin 
transfers in the west, interbasin water disputes continued to rage in Ari-
zona through the 1970's. 
The water shortage in Tucson, Arizona is instructive for Virginia 
Beach and many other cities elsewhere who face a serious shortage of 
water. Tucson receives an average of seven inches of rain each year as 
compared to 46-48 inches in Virginia Beach.75 Tucson's climate requires 
extensive irrigation to produce a green landscape, whereas Virginia 
Beach's grows naturally. Both cities have growing populations, too little 
freshwater, and growing demands for water. Both have conservation 
programs as well. 
When Tucson attempted to make an interbasin transfer from the town 
of Prescott, Arizona it met 11erce opposition similar to that faced by Vir-
ginia Beach when it attempted to make an interbasin withdrawal from 
Lake Gaston. In the end, Tucson was permitted to make an interbasin 
withdrawal under Arizona's water law. The law stated that the doctrine of 
prior appropriation was limited by the principle of reasonable use.76 When 
Tucson purchased farmland, the city received the farmer's rights to with-
draw groundwater. However, the court determined that the reasonable use 
doctrine required Tucson to take only the same amount or water each year 
that the farmer would have withdrawn to grow crops. In Virginia Beach's 
75. FRITZ VANDER LEEDEN, WATER ATLAS OF VIRGINL<\ PLATE 2-3 (1993). 
76. Probst, supra note 72. 
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situation, however, the city is dealing with original riparian laws with 
some modern alterations. 
The communities in the Roanoke River Basin have a property interest 
in the Lake Gaston water. For Virginia Beach to claim some of this water 
just because it is not now being used does not generate a right to the water. 
Although Virginia Beach may be larger and growing more rapidly, the 
Roanoke River Basin communities should have first right to the use of this 
natural resource. Any limitation which that action by Virginia Beach 
would impose on the growth of Roanoke River Basin communities would 
be reflected in future losses of revenue and jobs throughout the region. If 
Virginia laws were similar to Arizona's, then Virginia Beach could simply 
acquire land on the Roanoke River and reasonably use the water. The city 
would have to acquire the same amount of land as a large company to use 
the 65 mgd it desires. Because Virginia's laws differ from Arizona's, 
Virginia Beach will be forced to devise a solution that is practical and will 
satisfy future needs without generating excessive legal costs and open 
opposition from powerful and highly cohesive opponents. Virginia Beach 
also has to meet the strict requirements of many burdensome environmen-
tal laws which either did not exist at the time of western interstate com-
pacts or were just being developed during the settlements of the Arizona 
dispute. 
VII. WHERE DOES VIRGINIA BEACH Go FROM HERE? 
July 1995 brought the promised lawsuit by the south-central Virginia 
communities. The bickering and finger pointing between Democrats and 
Republicans, the legislature, and the governor continued apace.77 Ironi-
cally, Virginia Beach received PERC's flnal approval of the pipeline on 
July 26, 1995. The final EIS is a very intimidating document, including 
several hundred pages of test with an appendix that is larger than the 
statement. Twenty persons who were experts in the environmental sci-
ences-i.e., chemistry and biology; economics; mechanical, electrical, and 
civil engineering; and public administration were involved in the creation 
of the document which examined the issues and drew conclusions as to the 
best solution to Virginia Beach's water shortage. The EIS confirmed 
Virginia Beach's need for another water source.78 After considering the 
alternatives of desalinization and imported water to meet Virginia Beach's 
77. Todd Jackson, Franklin Join.v Lawsuit; County Enters Fray Over Lake Gaston, 
ROA.'IOKE Tl},lES & WORLD NEWS, May 17, 1995, at Cl. 
78. Office of Hydro power Licensing, Federal Energy Regulatory Conunission, Nonproject 
Use of Project Lands and Water for the City of Virginia Beach Water Supply Project, f;ERC No. 
2009-003 (July 26, 1995). 
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needs, the EIS favored the second option by a small margin.79 Despite the 
length of the EIS and the credentials of the persons preparing it, pipeline 
opponents still claim that the data used and the conclusions flowing from 
it are biased. 80 
FERC completed its EIS within one year. One anonymous source said 
that Senators Robb and Warner had unduly influenced PERC, as the 
Senators initially met with the head of FERC and even sat in on the recon-
firmation hearings although they were not on the committee overseeing the 
reconfirmation. 81 In interrogatories submitted by Senators Robb and 
Warner to Ms. Elizabeth Moler, Chair of PERC, the Senators asked ques-
tions that were connected to the Lake Gaston issue. Each time Ms. Moler 
responded by reminding the Senators that it is inappropriate to answer 
questions regarding the specifics of the currently disputed water project. 82 
Did the Senators hope to unethically persuade Ms. Moler to see the issue 
their way after grilling Ms. Moler and delaying her reconfirmation? The 
events following the reconfirmation in a very real sense speak for them-
selves. 
Although Chairwoman Moler testified that an EIS takes at least a year 
and usually more in a disputed case. PERC produced an EIS in less than 
a year. The steps and date of completion for PERC's EIS are as follows: 
1) Issuance of a Notice of Intent to Draft an EIS. June, 1995. 
2) Preparation of Scoping Documents-detailing the scope of the EIS. 
October, 1994. 
3) Research and Draft of the EIS (DEIS). January, 1995. 
4) Public Notice asking for comments on DEIS, and preparation of Final 
EIS. July, 1995. 
After the tenuous reconfirmation hearing Ms. Moler had promised that 
FERC would complete the EIS on an accelerated basis. Was the EIS 
accelerated or rushed? How does the EIS stand up against criticism? North 
Carolina's brief filed in appeal of PERC's EIS alleges that FERC utilized 
outdated data in the EIS. 83 For example the projected growth of Virginia 
Beach had been five percent a year. However, in 1990, the growth rate 
dropped to one percent where it has stayed for several years. Virginia 
Beach's slower growth rate has reduced the city's projected need for water 
79. !d. at 6-10. 
80. Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 45, at 21. 
81. Hearing on the nomination of Elizabeth Anne Moler, nominee for reappointment as a 
member of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission before the Senate Committee on Energy 
and Natural Resources, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1994) (statement of Senator Chuck Robb, Va). 
82. Letter from Elizabeth A. Moler, Chair, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, to 
Senator J. Bennett Johnston, Chairman, Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 19 
(Aug. I, 1994). 
83. Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 45, at 21. 
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by 15.2 mgd. When this number is combined with the excess 18 mgd 
Norfolk claims to have available, Virginia Beach would not need water 
from other sources for many years. 
Although Mr. Leahy, project manager for the proposed pipeline is 
frustrated by the opponents' accusations of bias, he is equally committed 
to obtaining the pipeline's approval. He stated that no other project has 
been put through a similar gambit of legal tests and government regulation. 
Virginia Beach has won every time, but opponents continue to be able to 
raise old arguments and put Virginia Beach through the "mill." Mr. Leahy 
believes that by bending over backwards for the pipeline's opponents, the 
courts and federal government are wasting taxpayer money and permitting 
these parochial attempts to delay the pipeline's construction. Leahy re-
mains committed to the Lake Gaston project to alleviate the current water 
shortage in Virginia Beach, but building the pipeline was blocked by 
Federal Court Judge Thomas F. Hogan subject to his ruling in the case 
pending September 22, 1995. 
Judge Hogan stated that he would rule as to "whether Commerce 
Secretary Ronald H. Brown acted appropriately when he overruled North 
Carolina's opposition to the pipeline."84 After receiving PERC's approval, 
Virginia Beach decided that it wanted no part of the mediated agreement 
and declared victory, claiming that the FERC decision means that North 
Carolina's opposition to the pipeline has failed. Virginia Beach also 
showed a degree of arrogance by approving the expenditure of more 
money to seek bids for the construction of the pipeline and the pumphouse. 
Still, the city risks losing more money if North Carolina and the RRBA 
continue their efforts to bring suit to delay or block the construction. 85 
For its part North Carolina has not repudiated the mediated agreement, 
though not relying on conciliation with Virginia Beach. The North 
Carolina Legislature passed a bill on July 27, 1995, making it illegal to 
take water from Lake Gaston without state approval. 86 Virginia Beach says 
that while two-thirds of Lake Gaston is in North Carolina, 75 percent of 
the water in the lake originates in Virginia. North Carolina Governor Jim 
Hunt urged Virginia Beach not to be premature in declaring victory in the 
12-year interstate battle. 87 He further stated that North Carolina would, if 
necessary, appeal the Commerce Department decision of two years ago, 
and also seek to block construction using newly enacted North Carolina 
84. Karen Weintraub, Last Agency OK's Gaston Pipeline: But FERC's Permit Awaits the 
uftmg of a Judge's Stay, VIRGINIAN-PILm·, July 27, 1995, at Bl. 
85. Karen Weintraub, Once Again, Pipeline Bids Sought: Beach Takes a Risk, Opts to 
Advertise to Save Some Time, VIRGINIAN-PILm', Aug. 9, 1995, at Bl. 
86. Carolina Counters on Gaston, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, July 28, 1995, at B3. 
87. Estes Thompson, Hunt: Pipeline May Go Back to Court, HERALD-SUN, Apr. 24, 1995, 
at C2. 
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legislation. If necessary, North Carolina may try to block the renewal of 
FERC' s 50-year lease to VEPCO which was let in 1951 for the construc-
tion of the Lake Gaston Dam, but will expire in the year 2001. North 
Carolina's objection to renewal may be based on the fact that Lake Gaston 
would no longer be used exclusively for generating electric power. On 
August 25, 1995, the RRBA and the State of North Carolina filed an 
appeal of the FERC decision asking FERC to rescind it<> approval. On 
September 25, 1995, the commission released a 16-page decision saying 
that North Carolina "had failed to unearth any new evidence or arguments 
that would cause the commissioners to reconsider their approval of the 
project issued in July."88 However, an injunction still blocked the com-
mencement of pipeline construction until Judge Hogan ruled on September 
28, 1996, upholding Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown's decision to 
overrule North Carolina's concern that the water project would violate the 
Coastal Zone Management Act was not "arbitrary and capricious."89 The 
Judge stated that he was not ruling on the merits of the pipeline, but 
deciding whether the Secretary's decision was reasonable. 
With the injunction lifted, Virginia Beach began the process of re-
viewing bids it had received from contractors to build the pipeline. In 
November Senators Faircloth and Helms introduced a bill which would 
require the approval of their governor for the Lake Gaston project to 
proceed. However, Virginia legislators quickly announced that they would 
block the legislation. 90 Later that month Mr. T. Keister Greer filed a 
lawsuit against the pipeline on behalf of some Southside legislators. 91 The 
lawsuit seeks a declaratory judgment that a permit for interbasin with-
drawal is unconstitutional in Virginia because the state law prohibits any 
intcrbasin water transfers. In order for the state to permit the transfer, it 
would require a two-thirds majority in the legislature to pass a special act. 
Because the state passed the law with only a simple majority, the lawsuit 
argues that the permit is invalid. Then, in December Governor Hunt of 
North Carolina ordered the state Department of Environmental Health and 
Nat ural Resources to hire the nation's best experts to reexamine the pipe-
line's effects on the environment tllis study would be used to challenge the 
relicensing of the Lake Gaston hydroelectric project in the year 2001. 92 
88. Alex Marshall, Beach Wins a Round of Gaston: Agency Refuses N.C. Request, 
VIRGINIAN PILOT, Sept. 26, !995, at B3. 
89. Beth Barber, On the Gaston Pipeline, Victory and Vindication for Virginia Beach, 
VIRGINIAN·-PJLOT, Oct. I, 1995, at 6. 
90. Karen Weintraub, N.C. Bill Aims to Plug Gaston; Robb, Warner, Pickett Say Effort Has 
Little Chance, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Nov. 16, 1995, at Bl. 
91. Interview with T.K. Greer, supra note 11. 
92. Karen Weintraub, North Carolina Flexes Its Muscles Against Gaston Pipeline; Gov. 
Hunt Wants a National Expert to Study Its Impact, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Dec. 5, 1995, at B3. 
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While pipe for the project was being produced in Maryland, Virginia 
Beach began in 1996 to request that a case begun in 1984 against landown-
ers along the Roanoke Rapids resume. 93 The city is seeking a declaratory 
judgment that landowners have no right to the water that would be used by 
the proposed pipeline. Despite recognition that there was little chance of 
passing legislation because of the power of Virginia Beach in the Virginia 
General Assembly, pipeline opponents from southside Virginia submitted 
a bill with 20 co-sponsors to defeat the project. 94 The final piece of signifi-
cant news related to the Gaston project was a study released at the end of 
January that called for the development of five high quality golf courses in 
Virginia Beach. A news article said the courses would transform the city 
into another "golf mecca."95 For a city hurting for water, a study recom-
mending the development of golf courses needing additional amounts of 
water for irrigation may appear presumptuous to opponents of the project. 
Near the beginning of March, Virginia Beach officials announced that 
they had reached an agreement with Virginia's Brunswick County to begin 
the construction of the pipeline.96 Then, on March 11, 1996 after almost 
five years of delays, construction of the pipeline began in Southhampton 
County. 97 The contractors plan to lay 800 to I ,000 feet of pipeline a day at 
a cost of $1 million per week. On May 16, 1996, Virginia Beach received 
more good news when the Isle of Wight County supervisors approved 
pipeline construction in their county. 98 Once again, the approval came after 
Virginia Beach provided an incentive-in this case a $3-million dollar 
contribution. 
However, the good news was short-lived. In June, pipeline opponents 
filed briefs appealing Judge Hogan's decision that lifted the injunction on 
pipeline construction.99 The case was scheduled to be argued September 9, 
1996 before the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. Also unsettling was Nor-
93. The Week in Review: VA. Beach Seeks to Restart Case, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, 
Jan. 14, 1996, at C4. 
94. Robert Little & David M. Poole, Legislators Try to Halt Pipeline; Bill Would Stop Up 
Va. Beach Water Source, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Jan. 20, 1996, at C3. 
95. Bill Reed, Rough Lie Ahead?; Golf Course Development Loomr Large, but Zoning 
Rules Could Be the Bogeyrrum, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Jdn. 26, 1996, at I 0. 
96. Before the agreement was reached, Virginia Beach had claimed that Brunswick County 
haJ already given its approval for pipeline construction. It is also important to note that Virginia 
Beach, in its zeal to begin pipeline construction, engineered Brunswick County's approval only 
after accepting "numerous conditions designed to minimize the impact on nearby homes." VA. 
Beach, Brunswick Reach Deal on Pipeline; The Agreement Allows the City to Build a Pumping 
Operation and 20 Miles of Pipe, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Mar. 9, 1996, at Bl. 
97. Karen Weintraub, Beach Begins Laying Pipeline; After a Five-Year Halt, Construction 
Resumes on the $150 Million Project, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, March 13, 1996, at Bl. 
98. Bob Piazza, Final Barrier Removed to Virginia Beach Pipeline, THE RICHMOND TIMES 
DISPATCH, May 17, 1996, at B3. 
99. Gaston Pipeline Opponents File New Challenges, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, June 15, 1996, at 
B5. 
340 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 11 
folk's release of a comprehensive five-year water study that reported 
capacity of 18 mgd more than formerly thought possible. 100 Ironically, 
North Carolina had just previously filed briefs arguing that Virginia Beach 
will need only 16 mgd more in the year 2030. 
Virginia Beach officials held several "executive sessions" to discuss 
the issue. One article reported that Virginia Beach's Vice Mayor W.D. 
Sessoms Jr. had to be flown in a police helicopter to and from his vacation 
in Duck, North Carolina. 101 Virginia Beach officials wanted to know why 
the city had been charged so much for extra Norfolk water if there were 
such an available excess, and Virginia Beach consultants were directed to 
look at information used to compile the study. 102 Not surprisingly, the 
consultants found that the data were different from the numbers used to 
determine Norfolk's developmental capacity. Although Norfolk main-
tained its support for the pipeline and eliminated the surcharge for extra 
water it was selling Virginia Beach, it was apparent that there were re-
newed tensions between the two cities. 103 In Virginia Beach, votes on a 
planned light rail and arena being developed by the two cities were de-
layed as a result of the fallout from the release of the water study. 104 
The arguments before the D.C. Circuit court on September 9, 
1996, were inconclusive. The court ruled that FERC needed to issue 
an opinion deciding whether the Clean Water Act gives North 
Carolina veto power over the Lake Gaston project before the court 
would issue a decision regarding North Carolina's appeal of the 
FERC permit i<;sued to Virginia Beach to build the pipeline. 105 FERC 
was given 60 days to make their decision. 
Meanwhile in October 1996, the city of Suffolk threw another 
wrench into completion of the Lake Gaston project by withholding 
approval for the expansion of the Norfolk pumping station in prepa-
ration to increase the capacity of the station in order to handle the 
100. Karen Weintraub, Water Study May Affect Pipeline Battle, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, June 16, 
1996, at Al. 
101. Ironically he was vacationing at a rival beach in one of the jurisdictions fighting the 
pipeline just to the south of his own beach. Karen Weintraub, Anger at Norfolk over Water Studv 
Persists, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, June 19, 1996, at B3. 
102. Bill Reed, Norfolk Lobs Yet Another Water Bomb At Virginia Beach, VIRGINlAJ'oi-PlLUf, 
.Tune 23, 1996, at 7. See also James K. Spore, For The Record, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, June 23, 1996, 
at J4. 
103. Karen Weintraub, DoubLr Persist, but Beach Takes Norfolk Offer to Pay less for Water, 
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, July 3, 1996, at AI. 
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Lake Gaston project water. 106 Suffolk officials said they need time to 
study the environmental impacts of the proposed project. It i<> ironic 
that Suffolk has chosen to delay granting its approval at the same 
time that it is negotiating for a new water purchasing agreement with 
Norfolk. Suffolk city officials are probably using the permit approval 
process to gain price and contract concessions from Norfolk. 
Then on October 24, 1996, the EPA issued an opinion to PERC 
stating that the agency agrees with North Carolina's argument that 
the state should have veto authority over the Lake Gaston project. 107 
FERC issued its opinion November 7, 1996, stating that North 
Carolina should not have veto power over the Lake Gaston pipe-
line. 108 While, Suffolk continued to delay its approval for the Condi-
tional Use Permits with Norfolk, North Carolina began to garner 
support for its position from other states. 109 On December 9, 1996, an 
amicus brief was filed with the D.C. Circuit Court by 26 state attor-
neys general in behalf of North Carolina. 11° Four days later another 
14 state attorneys general filed an amicus brief also in behalf of 
North Carolina. 111 To further muddy the waters, the Justice Depart-
ment filed a brief saying that North Carolina should only be able to 
veto the Lake Gaston project if the withdrawal significantly affects 
water quality downstream. 112 Virginia Attorney General James 
Gilmore then sent a letter to the attorneys general of the forty states 
suggesting that the states had been misled concerning the legal 
issues. m In response to this inquiry the Vermont attorney general 
106. Karen Weintraub and Terri Williams, Suffolk Delays Approval of Pipeline Pumping 
Station, 1be Virginian-Pilot, October 18, 1996, at B3. 
107. Karen Weintraub, EPA: N.C. has right to review pipeline, The Virginian-Pilot, October 
25, 1996, at At. 
108. Karen Weintraub, Agency backs VA. on pipeline, The Virginian-Pilot, November 8, 
1996, at B 1. 
109. Planning Commission tries to sink water penni!, The Virginian-Pilot, November 23, 
1996, at A14. 
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threatens "sovereign rights," they say, The Virginian-Pilot, December 11, 1996, at At. 
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wrote a letter saying he understood the issues and stood by his posi-
tion.114 
Misery loves company, because Virginia Beach filed a formal 
protest with FERC stating that if North Carolina has the right to 
review the Lake Gaston withdrawal, that South Carolina should have 
veto authority over a proposed water withdrawal North Carolina 
sought for the city of Charlotte-the difference between the two 
withdrawals is that Charlotte's withdrawal is from a lake completely 
within North Carolina. 115 On January 10, 1997, in a rare showing of 
state of Virginia's official position concerning the Lake Gaston 
project that Southside Virginians despise, Virginia Attorney General 
James Gilmore flied an amicus brief with the D.C. Circuit Court in 
behalf of Virginia Beach. 116 In the last of the amicus briefs filed 
before the February 4, 1997, court hearing regarding the PERC 
opinion, the American Public Power Association, the Edison Electric 
Institute and the National Hydropower Association also filed briefs 
in behalf of Virginia Beach. 117 These three groups represent hydro-
electric projects that serve three-fourths of the nation's "electric 
consumers." Reports of the court hearing said that the judges grilled 
all sides about "inconsistencies in their arguments" and accused the 
PERC attorneys of "trying to say two contradictory things at 
once." 118 A judgment from the hearing is expected in two to six 
months. Until that time the future of the Lake Gaston project contin-
ues to be uncertain. 
Suffolk continued to balk at granting the necessary permit to 
Norfolk until February 24, 1997, when the city voted to approve the 
conditional permit on the condition that Norfolk give up its right to 
use four wells within the city of Suffo1k. 119 Norfolk protested the 
decision by Suffolk to tie its approval to Norfolk's at-will use of the 
114. Karen Weintraub, Vermont official stands by position on Gaston Project; North 
Carolirw didn't mislead him, as Virginia official charged, he says., The Virginian-Pilot, January 
3,1997, at B3. 
115. Karen Weintraub, Beach files protest against Charlotte water project, The Virginian-
Pilot, January 10, 1997, at Bl. 
116. Gilmore files court papers opposing N.C. ort pipeline, The Virginian-Pilot, January 11, 
1997, at B4. 
117. Karen Weintraub, Beach wins Gaston support of 3 energy trade groups, "!be Virginian-
Pilot, January 16, 1997, at B5. 
118. Karen Weintraub, Judges hear views on pipeline; The U.S. Court of Appeals will now 
take as long as half a year to reach a decision, The Virginian-Pilot, February 5, 1997, at B 1. 
119. Suffolk Vote; water woes; Suffolk City Council dives into the water fight, The 
Virginian-Pilot, February 25, 1997, at A14. 
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four wells. After weeks of trying to negotiate a settlement behind the 
scenes, the cities of Norfolk, Chesepeake, and Virginia Beach f:tled 
suit against the city of Suffolk arguing that the conditions on the 
permit were arbitrary and capricious. 120 
Meanwhile, a legislator led lawsuit against the pipeline was 
decided in Virginia Beach's favor. 121 A Richmond judge ruled that a 
Virginia Law supporting the pipeline would not cause irreparable 
harm to landowners around Lake Gaston. FERC also announced 
plans to go ahead with the beginning stages of relicensing the Lake 
Gaston hydroelectric project. North Carolina has stated from the 
beginning that they will use their approval authority to veto the 
relicensing of the hydroelectric project to block the Lake Gaston 
project. 122 
Although Virginia Beach remains optimistic about a January 1998 
completion date of the pipeline and wants to avoid renegotiating a new 
contract to purchase Norfolk's surplus water, 13 years of legal battles and 
over $50 million in expenditures have brought the Lake Gaston project no 
closer to fruition. Indeed the many remaining legal barriers may turn the 
pipeline project into a pipe dream. 123 
What caused the stalemate in the Lake Gaston water deal? Was it 
partisan politics? The answer is a resounding no! The Lake Gaston pro-
posal was precedent setting and divisive to both Democrats and Republi-
cans. Although Governor George Allen did not call a special legislative 
session, many legislators from both parties were on record as opposing the 
mediated Lake Gaston agreement. 
Did the stalemate result from the parochial actions of selfish riparian 
landowners along the Roanoke River, or did it stem from the machinations 
of a relatively wealthy but water-poor city with a high population who 
wanted to take water without proper consultation and adequate compensa-
tion? Just as Virginia Beach had not planned for sufficient water to meet 
future demand, the city also failed to anticipate the opposition tor each 
step of the proposed pipeline's approval and construction. Where might 
120. Karen Weintraub and Terri Williams, Suffolk hit with "angrier" suit; Suffolk rejects 
Gaston compromise, takes on lawsuit., The Virginian-Pilot, March 21, 1997, at Bl. 
121. Karen Weintraub, Beach scores another legal win in fight over Lake Gaston water, The 
Virginian-Pilot, February 15, 1997, at B3. 
122. Karen Weintraub, North Carolina want,; to tie power company license to pipeline; new 
skirmish brews in 14-year war over Virginia's thirst for Lake Gaston water., The Virginian-Pilot, 
March 13, 1997, at B7. 
123. Tom Holden, No Langer A Pipe Dream, Lake Gaston Project Now Seems a Certainty, 
But Beach Residents Will Have to Maintain One of The Nation's Best Conservation Habits, 
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the city have been if it had more amicably spent its effort and resources 
toward obtaining agreements permitting the pipeline rather than displaying 
an ''I'm taking it because you are not using it" attitude? Opposition to the 
pipeline has succeeded in effectively blocking completion of the project 
for 13 years. Southside Virginia in the Roanoke River Basin has 700,000 
people and currently accounts for 23 percent of the manufacturing jobs in 
the state. 124 Admittedly, manufacturing jobs are not the state's biggest 
employers. Still, $4.6 billion in salaries a year are paid in those jobs. First 
the RRBA intervened in behalf of south-central Virginia, because this 
group had originally been instrumental in building reservoirs throughout 
south-central Virginia including Kerr, Roanoke Rapids, Smith Mountain 
Lake, Philpott. Also, the group helped designate a state park on land 
surrounding Smith Mountain Lake. 125 The RRBA, lastly started the re-
gional planning system used by the State of Virginia in state planning 
districts. However, the last 10 to 12 years have been spent fighting pro-
posed interbasin transfers by North Carolina and Virginia Beach. A group 
of manufacturers from south-central Virginia calling themselves Fair Play 
for all Virginia has also helped represent south-central Virginia. Indeed, 
this group participated in negotiations modifying the original mediated 
agreement. Thus, while these manufacturers are mostly interested in their 
needs and preserving their current uses of the water, their actions also 
benetit Roanoke River Basin citizens. Still, many citizens of this region 
feel they will be steamrolled by the powerful political clout of cities like 
Virginia Beach; therefore, they have worked to gain more time to plan 
each appeal and lawsuit to thwart Virginia Beach's attempts to take Lake 
Gaston water. Virginia Beach Senator Kenneth Stolle was right when he 
said that the agreement reached at the end of April 1995 between North 
Carolina and Virginia Beach was far from being a done deal. 126 
Although the concessions were made on paper for south-central 
Virginia, the citizens remain underrepresented in the agreement. Why 
didn't Virginia Beach want Southside or Norfolk involved in the mediated 
agreement? Perhaps the greatest example of Virginia Beach's intentions to 
interfere with south-central Virginia's water uses was shown in 1994 when 
South Hill applied for a permit to withdraw 10 mgd more water from a 
Lake Gaston tributary while Virginia Beach filed a document with the 
state in opposition to the proposed withdrawal. 127 South Hill was eventu-
124. W.W. "Ted" Bennett, Jr., The Lake Gaston Pipeline: Let's Have Fair Play for All 
Virginians, VIRGINIAN-Pllflf, June 8, 1995, at A10. 
125. Interview with William E. Barr, supra note 8. 
126. Karen Weintraub, Gaston Deal At Hand; N.C., Beach to Sign Pact Friday; Both Sides 
to End Legal Fight; Legislatures Must Sign by July; Beach to OK Norfolk Water Plant, 
VIRGINIAN-Pllflf, APR. 27, 1995, at Al. 
127. Bennett, supra note 124, at AlO. 
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ally granted 7 mgd. While critics argue that south-central Virginia is 
claiming an ownership interest in something that is not theirs and are 
themselves in danger of becoming too involved in expensive court battles, 
what right under common law did Virginia Beach (which lies in a different 
water basin) have to block South Hill's application? The involvement of 
federal agencies permitted Virginia Beach to bypass traditional common 
law precedent and appeal to the federal government which granted the 
Army Corps of Engineers the right to decide the use of the navigable 
waters involved in Corps projects. In opposing the South Hill request, 
Virginia Beach was probably trying to signal that it did not support the 
principle of allowing everyone including Roanoke River Basin communi-
ties to withdraw water from Lake Gaston, especially when the proposed 
withdrawal might interfere with its own withdrawal. 
Most pipeline supporters, including Virginia Legislator Clarence 
Holland say that south-central Virginia is complaining about possible but 
unlikely restrictions of the use of Roanoke River Basin water. 128 Based on 
the fact that five billion gallons of water a day flow unused down the 
Roanoke River, Virginia Beach authorities point out that they are asking 
for less than two percent of the daily water flow or 60 mgd for Virginia 
Beach and 35 mgd for North Carolina. PERC determined that 200 mgd 
above current uses could be withdrawn before any detrimental environ-
mental impacts, i.e., drops in water nutrient levels, would occur. The 
mediated agreement contained a provision allocating Virginia Beach 
money to fight the algae that grows in the reservoirs. However, as south-
central communities increase their current withdrawals, they worry about 
the 95 mgd to be withdrawn by Virginia Beach and North Carolina. Mr. 
Ewell Barr, President of the RRBA, stated that to open the door to with-
drawals, is to open a floodgate of water-hungry jurisdictions who will seek 
water from outside their basins. 129 Mr. Gerald Lovelace, Halifax County 
Assistant Administrator, echoed Mr. Barr when he said that the primary 
reason his county decided to oppose the Virginia Beach withdrawal was 
that the pipeline would be adverse to the growth of their county-whether 
real or perceived. 130 Mr. Lovelace also said that water is the lifeblood of 
the county. Mr. G. Morris Wells Jr., Town Manager of South Hill, said 
that if the 60 mgd were all that were ever withdrawn, it would be okay. 
However, upstream of Virginia Beach would equate to the camel getting 
its nose under the tent, which doesn't give South Hill great consolation. 131 
128. Clarence Holland, Refuting Ruff'.~ Tale of Water Torture, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Aug. 8, 
1995, at A14. 
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At the time North Carolina was satisfied with the negotiated agreement 
and has informally offered (as late as last December) to settle the dispute 
with Virginia Beach through ratification. 132 
Pipeline opponents do not believe PERC or Corps analyses of the 
Roanoke River are accurate. This concern is exacerbated when one consid-
ers that the combined 95 mgd withdrawal for Virginia Beach and North 
Carolina is 47.5 percent of the 200 mgd rate PERC determined could be 
withdrawn before detrimental environmental impact occurred. South Hill 
has received state approval for 7 mgd and Henderson, N.C. is seeking 
another 10 mgd which effectively raises the total withdrawal to 56 percent 
of the available water. However, the proposed Virginia Beach withdrawal 
is the total water necessary for the city until the year 2030. Thus, permit-
ting this initial withdrawal does not appear to be a real threat to south-
central Virginia communities. According to one source, Virginia Beach is 
having the pipeline built under the assumption that no person, legislator, or 
judge can stop a completed pipeline. 
Complicating these matters for Virginia Beach are the issues of 
whether the resolution of the Lake Gaston proposal hinges on resolving 
state vs. federal rights, state vs. state, intrastate city vs. city rights, or an 
amalgamation of the three. The original basis of the Lake Gaston dispute 
involved Virginia Beach's efforts to use federal regulations to induce the 
Army Corps of Engineers to reallocate water from the Roanoke River 
Basin. The State of North Carolina has invoked federal law, specifically 
the Coastal Zone Management Act and section 401 of the Clean Water 
Act, to compel the Department of Commerce to grant the state reviewing 
authority in the approval process for the Lake Gaston Project. Virginia 
Beach wants a declaratory judgment averring that the RRBA communities 
and counties had no ownership interest in the Lake Gaston water. How-
ever, many south-central Virginia counties have raised legal blocks to the 
project, which these counties see as a threat to their control of water over 
which they have ownership interests. 
To understand the issues, one must consider many other questions. Is 
the RRBA' s anti-Lake Gaston sentiment a knee-jerk reaction to environ-
mental concerns? Does this opposition rise from a baseless fear of extreme 
scenarios invoking provisions of environmental laws? Could the RRBA be 
assured that the withdrawal of water for Virginia Beach will never affect 
the current uses of Roanoke River Basin water? 
Environmental law is a relatively new area of law. Until the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was instituted in the United States in 
132. Karen Weintraub, Gaston Pipeline Runs Hot, Cold, VIRGINIAN-PILar, Dec. 31, 1995, 
at 7. 
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1969 and the Environmental Protection Agency was created by President 
Nixon's Executive Order, in 1970, environmental issues were rarely a 
focus of the American public. Nonetheless, during the decade that fol-
lowed, many laws were passed to protect the environment. In the 1980's 
many of the acts from the 70's were used as shields for pro-environment 
interests, thereby spurring public debate over the necessity and extent of 
governmental intervention in the environment. An example of such shield-
ing is seen in invoking legislation to protect the spotted owl in Oregon 
against the logging industry. 
In the case of the Lake Gaston project, current environmental laws are 
being cited under future scenarios. In one scenario, Virginia Beach is 
given approval from the RRB A to build the pipeline. Several years after it 
is built, Virginia Beach complains to the RRBA that the water it is receiv-
ing is being contaminated by all of the recreational, community, and 
industrial uses of Lake Gaston and also other upstream users of Roanoke 
River water. If the RRBA communities repudiated the charge, Virginia 
Beach could invoke the Clean Water Act to obtain a federal mandate 
restricting recreational uses while also regulating community and indus-
trial uses upstream from Virginia Beach's withdrawal facility. 133 A federal 
mandate would result in higher costs for RRBA communities and indus-
tries attempting to control water quality. Additionally, it would leave many 
citizens who have built homes along the Roanoke River and its lakes 
without recreational privileges. One unhappy result would be a devalua-
tion of homes and property. Another powerful scenario has other water-
hungry cities seeking Roanoke River water. This could result in a dry river 
bed in North Carolina similar to the Colorado River, which once roared, 
but now merely trickles into Mexico from California. 
The above illustrations are only possibilities, and relatively few cases 
like the spotted owl occur. Still, anything less than complete assurance 
against attempts to limit current uses is unacceptable to the RRBA. Educa-
tion is always a valuable tool in allaying unsubstantiated fears. However, 
no amount of education could allay the angst of Roanoke River Basin 
communities if the mediated agreement permits further withdrawals or 
restrictions on current uses of Lake Gaston water. 
VIII. OPTIONS FOR VIRGINIA BEACH 
How can Virginia Beach avoid further costly litigation that increases 
the frustration of implementing the proposed project? Are there other 
133. Christopher Kirkpatrick, Governor Bashing Popular Sport Around Lake Gaston, 
HERALD-SUN, July 3, 1995, at AI. 
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viable alternatives to a continuation of the 12-year legal struggle for 
water? There are indeed some that are worthy of consideration. 
First, the city could seek a quasi-governmental negotiation to mediate 
behind closed doors with all sides politically represented. Such an agree-
ment would involve the RRBA, the Tidewater Virginia communities, and 
the two states. Subsequent approval by state and federal legislatures 
should be pro forma because of the amalgamation of bipartisan and private 
interests. Virginia Beach does need water, and south-central Virginia 
governments are willing to share. Sixty mgd is not an overwhelming 
amount of water even if another 35 mgd were allocated to North Carolina 
communities. A new agreement would permit Virginia Beach to meet its 
water needs for at least 35 more years, by which time technology would 
likely reduce the costs of developing other water sources. However, any 
new mediated agreement should permit no further withdrawals from Lake 
Gaston without express authorization from the Roanoke River Basin 
communities. Absent that stipulation, North Carolina and Virginia could 
agree to future interbasin withdrawals without including the Roanoke 
River Basin communities. Moreover, the Roanoke River Basin communi-
ties are insisting on, "dependable assurances,"134 and more "safeguard<;"135 
for access to the water, i.e., "consent of the host jurisdiction,"136 before 
approving the Lake Gaston project. Indeed, Mr. Gerald Lovelace of Hali-
fax County says the opposition is not optimistic that an agreement could 
be reached that safeguards other interbasin transfers from the Roanoke 
River Basin. 137 
Another prerequisite to a negotiated agreement should require any 
jurisdiction(s) seeking Lake Gaston water to maximize the use of available 
water in its basin. Virginia Beach could maximize its water resources by 
extending previous economic incentives, such as providing incentives for 
low-flush toilets in new homes. Demand can also be reduced by replacing 
aging water mains. Furthermore, by developing incremental water supplies 
Virginia Beach could delay its need for Lake Gaston water for years. Some 
people would say that Virginia Beach is being visionary in solving all of 
its water supply problems with the pipeline. However, opponents say that 
Virginia Beach is not willing to use incremental sources of water, some-
thing which other water-hungry jurisdictions find necessary. Also, the 
negotiated agreement should make sure that adequate payments for the 
upkeep of Lake Gaston to fight the algae that thrive in many reservoirs 
would be paid to the Corps which operates the lake. Some south-central 
134. Interview with William E. Barr, supra note 8. 
135. Interview with G. Morris Wells, Jr., supra note 10. 
136. Interview with W.W. "Ted" Bennett, Jr., supra note 59. 
137. Interview with Gerald Lovelace, supra note 9. 
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community leaders were concerned that the payments might be applied 
towards environmental studies for enlarging the Lake Gaston pipeline or 
other withdrawal proposals instead of fighting algae and other detrimental 
side effects. 
A second alternative for Virginia Beach would be to spearhead the 
creation of a Tidewater Regional Water Authority involving the cities of 
Chesapeake, Hampton Roads, Portsmouth, Virginia Beach, and Norfolk. 
This Authority would correlate and pool available water resources and 
develop and plan for new sources in the future. Mr. Ewell Barr of the 
RRBA also supports a regional authority for Lake Gaston water. 138 How-
ever, a regional water authority is a new idea for eastern cities. Many 
western cities have water authorities or irrigation districts that work for the 
fair allocation of water among private citizens. Often citizens who had 
initial water rights do not pay, or else pay a substantially reduced water tax 
while owners of new homes pay a higher tax or a one-time fee. This water 
authority would have authority to mediate water disputes and approve or 
deny requests for water. Although this authority may have to deny some 
water requests, western water authorities have made similar tough deci-
sions for years without jeopardizing the commissions' power. In the initial 
creation of a regional water authority, the greatest challenge is that of 
negotiating a partnership agreement. 139 
A third option is desalinization. In considering the economics of 
desalinization, one must remember that to complete the Lake Gaston 
project, Virginia Beach will have to pay at least $242 million and perhaps 
more if the disputing parties resume litigation. Would water desalinization 
be cheaper than this? Mr. Bobby Owens of the Dare County Board of 
Supervisors states that his county currently desalinates brackish water for 
$1.25 per 1 ,000 gallons-a quite reasonable rate for the reverse osmosis 
process. 140 He says it is so successful that a second desalinization plant is 
planned for the city of Kill Devil Hills. Thomas M. Leahy, who is in 
charge of the Lake Gaston project, says that it would cost $2 per 1 ,000 
gallons for Lake Gaston water and $6 dollars per 1,000 gallons to desali-
nate ocean water. 141 The high cost, says Leahy, is due to the expense of 
building a desalinization plant (approximately $500 million). Although 
initial plant costs are high, new technology continues to lower the costs of 
desalinization. Innovations such as using steam pressure tor the desaliniza-
138. Interview with William E. Barr, supra note 8. 
139. Karen Weintraub, Gaston Q & A: What Remains to Be Done on Pipeline'!, VIRGINIAN-
PILOT, Apr. 8, 1995, at Al. 
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tion distillation process or high-pressured eftluent from the reverse osmo-
sis process to turn electric turbines to create electricity could permit 
Virginia Beach to meet greater power demands while providing much 
needed water. Moreover, because desalinated water would, at least ini-
tially, constitute only a small proportion of the total water consumed by 
Virginia Beach, the increase of cost to the consumers would be negligible. 
Desalinization is supported by Messrs. Barr, Lovelace, and Bennett, 
and this option is even more reasonable if used in conjunction with a 
regional authority inasmuch as the initial costs can be shared by a larger 
customer base. A regional authority also delays the need to build desalini-
zation plants, because Portsmouth and other cities within the Tidewater 
area currently have some excess water that could be used to meet the needs 
of water-poor water authority members. 
Even if the Tidewater authority eventually needed to build desaliniza-
tion plants, the costs will continue to drop as new technologies are devel-
oped besides, the plants can be built in stages that permit the deferral of 
high building costs. The available types of desalinization include distilla-
tion and reverse osmosis, and the more experimental solar powered and gel 
processes. Senator Warner could save enough money by cutting one B-1 
bomber (which has the capacity to kill thousands) from the military budget 
to pay for the building of one desalinization plant that could provide water 
for thousands. 
Many of the western states' Senators would likely favor the construc-
tion of a desalinization plant, because they know how difficult it is to 
supply water for their citizens and industries. For example, in Arizona and 
Utah the federal government has provided billions of dollars to build the 
Central Arizona Project and the Central Utah Project. The cost of these 
projects dwarfs any proposal by Virginia Beach to obtain water, whether 
it be by desalinization or other means. A well conceived water proposal by 
Virginia Beach would generate more empathy within the western states 
who have long fought for federal funds in order to build and maintain 
essential water projects. As the population of the United States grows and 
water becomes more scarce, our nation must be willing to pay for the 
installation and implementation of water projects. Each community must 
pay its share whether it is through a federal dollar-matching agreement or 
a percentage share. 
In the author's view, the best alternative for Virginia Beach is an 
amalgamation of the three proposals. If a compromise could be reached 
legislating no further large-scale interbasin withdrawals from Lake Gaston, 
Virginia Beach would have an assured supply of low-cost water for a 
minimum of 35 years. Meanwhile, new technology should permit lower 
cost solutions for additional supplies of water. Creation of a Tidewater 
Regional Water Authority also would permit and require the maximization 
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of Tidewater water resources before using Lake Gaston water. Methods 
for desalinization are improving and even if the Tidewater region needed 
more water before the year 2030, the costs of developing a joint desalini-
zation plant would reduce the costs of individual communities each trying 
to establish a separate desalinization operation. However, if a mediated 
agreement concerning Lake Gaston cannot be reached, a water authority in 
the Tidewater region would be advantageous to maximize available water 
sources and reduce the costs of developing a de..o;;alinization plant(s) or 
other water resources. 
A<> a third alternative Virginia Beach could, with or without a Tidewa-
ter Regional Water Authority, provide financial assistance in the develop-
ment of alternative water resources such as desalinization. Under such a 
gambit, Virginia Beach could seek the assistance of Governor Allen who 
is an advocate of bringing high technology to Virginia. Senators Warner 
and Robb also could contribute to obtaining federal government funding 
for any large-scale water prqjects. Such thinking is not unrealistic; Senator 
Paul Simon of Illinois and others have already proposed a bill: "S 811, to 
authorize research into the desalinization and reclamation of water and 
authorize a program for states, cities, or qualifying agencies desiring to 
own and operate a water desalinization or reclamation facility to develop 
such facilities." 142 A government grant could help Virginia Beach study the 
feasibility of and build a massive desalinization plant similar to those in 
Saudi Arabia which can desalinate more than 264 mgd, which is roughly 
four times the total predicted need of Virginia Beach through the year 
2030. 
Regardle..<;s of the alternative(s) chosen, Virginia Beach needs to 
maintain its extremely etlective water conservation program. Virginia 
Beach uses 80 gallons a day per person including water for commercial 
purpose...;;, as compared to 137 gallons in Phoenix and 85 gallons in San 
Diego. 143 If there is a real fear of future water shortages in Virginia, the 
state legislature could mandate water-saving devices for new and refitted 
homes and other conservation measures less drastic than Virginia Beach's 
current conservation laws. The high level of conservation in Virginia 
Beach is a tribute to the efforts of a concerned administration and a moti-
vated citizenry. 
142. Bills & Resolurions Introduced, Daily Report For Executives, May 19, 1995, at F. 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
What do we learn about the law from this case? One thing is certain, 
all sides disagree on what data to use. Each side claims its interpretation 
of the data is correct. A source close to North Carolina said that he be-
lieves that time will prove which data is right. 144 He believes it will show 
that Virginia Beach doesn't have a need. Litigation alone has cost over $10 
million. Virginia Beach made mistakes in not seeking serious negotiations 
with Roanoke River Basin communities. Poor public relations also hurt 
Virginia Beach. Although Virginia Beach had real water needs, opponents 
to the project used inflammatory scenarios of environmental laws gone 
awry to convince many Roanoke River Basin citizens that their whole lives 
would be turned upside down by this project. It has been easy but costly 
for opponents to use legal procedure to stall the approval and regulatory 
process. This has frustrated Virginia Beach which only sought to fulfill its 
water needs in a sensible fashion. 
Although early colonization usually occurred in fertile areas that 
could support large populations, transfer and pumping technology can now 
supply water to support a growing population and industrial base. Unlike 
the western states whose water laws are mostly governed by the doctrine 
of prior appropriation, the eastern states need a firm water policy that 
coincides with riparian law. Virginia and North Carolina have the opportu-
nity to show other eastern jurisdictions how large-scale interbasin transfers 
may help water-poor jurisdictions without destroying or overregulating the 
riparian rights of water-rich localities. 
Virginia Senator John Warner was quoted as saying that, "My jubila-
tion will await my first drink out of the end of the [Lake Gaston] 
pipeline."145 Senator Warner's statement is a summarization of hope for 
interstate water agreements in the east. However, even if the pipeline 
agreement were ratified and construction continued, pipeline service could 
not commence before 1998. 
If current views are correct, the pipeline proposal will continue to be 
plagued by litigation. Lake Gaston water is currently the least expensive of 
the alternatives. Implementing the Tidewater Regional Water Authority, 
maximizing the usage of water available within the authority, and seeking 
a negotiated agreement for Lake Gaston water with all affected parties 
would resolve Virginia Beach's water needs. Otherwise, Virginia Beach 
should reconsider desalinization. The final EIS by FERC shows that 
144. Interview with source close to North Carolina's decisionmaking processes, name 
withheld, in N.C. (July 1996). 
145. Mason Peters et al., Gaston Breakthrough; Possible Truce in 15-Year VA.-N.C. Battle 
is at Hand; The Deal, Far From Final, Could End Tangle of Litigation, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Apr. 
7, 1995, at Al. 
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although desalinization is costly, it, too, offers a feasible and reliable 
source of water. 146 Although Virginia Beach has recently cleared another 
barrier in receiving FERC's approval and has begun building the pipeline, 
pipeline opponents promise that they will not quit fighting. North Carolina 
has many options it may exercise in fighting the pipeline. Its option in-
clude a case of original jurisdiction in the United States Supreme Court or 
exercising its power to reject the reauthorization of the federal hydroelec-
tric power project at Lake Gaston in 2002. After years of legal battles over 
the pipeline option, Virginia Beach authorities ought to seek reconciliation 
through mediated negotiations. At the same time, Southside, Virginia and 
North Carolina should not expect Virginia Beach to submit to excessive or 
arbitrary conditions unrelated to the use of Lake Gaston water. 
As Susan J. Buck notes, the one thing that participants in the adminis-
trative and legal process must understand is that nothing is ever t1nal. 147 If 
Virginia Beach wants a solution to its water needs that is indeed "final," it 
may wish to abandon the environmental and legal entanglements engulfing 
the pipeline proposal and turn to other options. 
Appendix 
WHY PIPELINE OPPONENTS REMAIN ADAMANT 
Many opponents of the Virginia Beach water initiative remain uncon-
vinced of the need to withdraw water from Lake Gaston. RRBA President 
Ewell Barr, believes that Virginia Beach is basically attempting to become 
independent from Norfolk water, and that Virginia Beach as the largest 
city in the state is merely f1exing its muscle against southeastern 
Virginia. 148 Mr. Barr further asserts that the accompanying regulatory 
authority on upstream water uses would also subject south-central Virginia 
to the control of Virginia Beach. 
For its part, Norfolk seems content with its role as the arbiter of water 
resources in southeastern Virginia. When questioned about the possibility 
of creating a regional water authority, Norfolk representatives have as-
serted that such an authority would only add an unnecessary layer of 
bureaucracy to the current system of water allocation, which Norfolk now 
controls. Norfolk's response appears to be crafted to parry the question of 
control and authority over water in southeastern Virginia. One expert on 
regionalism gave an example concerning two Michigan cities-one was 
146. Office of Hydropower Licensing, supra at note 79. 
147. SUSAN J. BUCK, UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATION AND LAW (1991). 
148. Barr, supra note 8. 
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water-poor and the other water-rich-who battled over water rights in the 
1950's. Years later the water-poor jurisdiction has grown and the water-
rich jurisdiction which refused to share has disappeared. This expert says 
that if jurisdiction." would look at water issues as regional issues then they 
could see the purpose of helping one another. However, in this case Vir-
ginia Beach needs water and south-central does not want to share because 
it fears other water-poor jurisdictions will also seck large-scale interbasin 
water transfers. Complicating the matter is the issue of why Virginia 
Beach wants to sever its water dependency from Norfolk. Virginia Beach 
claims that it's only seeking a dependable water source. What will Norfolk 
do with the 30 mgd it currently supplies Virginia Beach once the city starts 
using Lake Gaston water? Obviously, Norfolk could market its water to 
other cities in the Tidewater region, but critics point out that it makes little 
sense to take water from Lake Gaston when there is excess water available 
within the Tidewater basin. A severe drought within the basin might 
change the opponents view. Also, as other cities and communities grow 
and the current 30 mgd provided to Virginia Beach by Norfolk is used by 
the growing needs of these jurisdictions, opponents might then concede 
that Virginia Beach should be permitted to usc Lake Gaston water to meet 
its current consumption needs. 
Richard T. Probst 
